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Abstract
The popularity of cloud computing has increased significantly in the last few years
due to scalability, cost efficiency, resiliency, and quality of service. Organizations are
more interested in outsourcing the database and DBMS functionalities to the cloud
owing to the tremendous growth of big data and on-demand access requirements. As
the data is outsourced to untrusted parties, security has become a key consideration to
achieve the confidentiality and integrity of data. Therefore, data owners must trans-
form and encrypt the data before outsourcing. In this paper, we focus on a Secure and
Verifiable Computation for k-Nearest Neighbor (SVC-kNN) problem. The existing
verifiable computation approaches for the kNN problem delegate the verification task
solely to a single semi-trusted party. We show that these approaches are unreliable in
terms of security, as the verification server could be either dishonest or compromised.
To address these issues, we propose a novel solution to the SVC-kNN problem that
utilizes the random-splitting approach in conjunction with the homomorphic proper-
ties under a two-cloud model. Specifically, the clouds generate and send verification
proofs to end-users, allowing them to verify the computation results efficiently. Our
solution is highly efficient from the data owner and query issuers’ perspective as it
significantly reduces the encryption cost and pre-processing time. Furthermore, we
demonstrated the correctness of our solution using Proof by Induction methodology to
prove the Euclidean Distance Verification.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Outsourcing data and computational tasks to the cloud is gaining importance as it provides
efficiency and flexibility to data owners. It also reduces the infrastructure needs of orga-
nizations by providing hardware, software, storage, and maintenance as a service [1] [2].
Cloud computing is known to offer database as a service (DBaS) that helps organizations
to achieve improved productivity, better standards, and data security. However, it raises
some concerns about preserving the privacy and accuracy of data. In other words, the
clouds can be compromised or behave dishonestly due to financial incentives or malicious
activities [3], [4].
In this project, we study the kNN problem where the data owner outsources the data and the
computational tasks to the cloud. Besides, the end-user submits queries and obtains the top
k records from the database. Since the clouds are untrusted parties, there are high chances
that they provide inaccurate results to the end-user. Errors can occur unintentionally dur-
ing the computation process or intentionally due to monetary gain or malicious activities.
Specifically, the cloud might choose to return a random result instead of executing heavy
computations assuming that it is difficult to detect this behavior due to the lack of a verifi-
cation mechanism at the end-user’s end [5]. Therefore, it is essential to develop a scheme
that protects the confidentiality of data and verifies the accuracy of returned results. We
focus on addressing the problem of (1) secure processing of queries over encrypted data in
the cloud and (2) verifying the correctness of the kNN results.
In our approach, we consider the Euclidean Distance as the distance metric to compute the
top k records for a given query Q. More specifically, given a query Q, the scheme should
compute the distance between Epk(Q) and encryption of each tuple Epk(ti) in the database
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(DB) and return (1) the k-nearest tuples to Q and (2) proofs to verify the correctness of the
results. To preserve confidentiality, all computations should be implemented on encrypted
data, and the scheme must hide the data access patterns during the query processing and
the verification phase [6], [7].
Several papers have addressed the computation of the SkNN problem [8], [9], [10]; how-
ever, they did not take the verification of results into account. The proposed methods
in [9] [10] are not CPA-secure. Moreover, the schemes in [9] [11] [12] incur heavy com-
putations at the end-user during the query processing step, and [11] returns approximate
kNN results to the end-user. While the proposed SkNN protocol in [8] is considered to be
secure, it requires the data owner to encrypt the entire database before outsourcing, which
consumes the data owners computational resources. Further, [13] produces a method to
verify the integrity of outsourced frequent itemset mining by transforming some real tuples
to fake and vice-versa. The correctness and completeness are verified by checking against
the fake itemsets. However, using similar verification methods for the kNN problem is in-
appropriate because the results for kNN computation depend on the user’s query, which is
different and unpredictable. Lastly, researchers in [14] proposed a verification protocol for
the kNN problem. However, there are security considerations in their approach. Firstly, it
involves a single party in the verification process. Secondly, the scheme uses Asymmetric
Scalar Product Encryption, which is insecure against Known Plaintext Attacks. Lastly, the
scheme reveals the data access patterns to the cloud as the information about indices of
fake tuples is disclosed to the verifying server.
2
Figure 1: System Model
1.2 Problem Definition
Suppose a data owner owns a database DB of n records, denoted by t1,..., tn, and m
attributes. Let ti,j represents the jth attribute value of record ti. Before outsourcing, the
data owner adds nf fake tuples to the DB, randomly splits the database attribute-wise
into two shares DB1 and DB2, and sends them to a Cloud Service Provider1, CSP1 and
Cloud Service Provider2, CSP2, respectively. Moreover, future query processing tasks are
delegated to the clouds. Similarly, an authorized end-user randomly splits the query Q =
〈Q1,...,Qm〉 attribute-wise into two shares Q1 and Q2, and sends them to CSP1 and CSP2,
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respectively. The two clouds collaborate to obtain the Epk(DB) and Epk(Q), compute the
top k records, and send the results to the end-user. It is important to mention that the two
clouds do not collude with each other.
In the SVC-kNN protocol, the data owner generates auxiliary information once during the
Database Outsourcing Stage. The clouds will use this information to verify the computed
top k records. Specifically, CSP1 and CSP2 employ the auxiliary information to construct
the proofs δ1, δ2, H(ζ1), and H(ζ2). In addition to the computation results, the clouds send
the proofs to the end-user for verification purposes. We divide the verification process into
the Euclidean Distance Verification and Sort Verification. We emphasize that our verifi-
cation scheme is probabilistic and the proofs are constructed using only fake tuples. We
assume that if verification were successful, the returned results are correct with a high prob-
ability. Moreover, it is important to mention that the contents of Q1, Q2, DB1 and DB2
remain confidential throughout the query processing and verification phases. Furthermore,
the data access patterns are also hidden from the clouds. Figure 1 shows the information
flow across different parties in the proposed framework.
1.3 Our Contributions
We propose a novel SVC-kNN protocol to verify the correctness of the top k records.
Firstly, we verify the results of the computed Euclidean distances (di), and we prove that
our theorem always holds for validating euclidean distances. Secondly, we verify the sorted
distances. Moreover, the SVC-kNN protocol minimizes the workload and the encryption
cost on the data owner and the end-user because it does not require them to directly encrypt
DB and Q. Instead, it allows them to randomly split their data and send each share to
the corresponding CSP . Subsequently, CSP1 and CSP2 coordinate to obtain Epk(DB)
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and Epk(Q), which improves the efficiency. Besides, the data owner is not required to
participate in kNN computation and result verification. Furthermore, the protocol is secure
under the semi-honest model and satisfies the following requirements:
• Data confidentiality – The contents of DB and Q should remain confidential at all
times.
• Hide data access patterns from the cloud – information about the k-nearest tuples
to the Q should not be revealed to any intermediate party.
• Accurately compute the k-nearest neighbors of query Q.
•Minimize computation overhead on the data owner.
• Final results should not be revealed to the cloud.
• Accurately generate proofs for verifying the computed results.
We emphasize that our probabilistic verification scheme utilizes two cloud service providers,
CSP1 and CSP2, to construct the proofs. Each CSP sends its proof to the end-user for
each verification stage: Euclidean Distance Verification and Sort Verification. The end-user
obtains proofs for each verification step to check the equality. It is important to mention that
the clouds start the sort verification only if the Euclidean distance verification is successful.
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1.4 Organization
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related works. Section
3 reviews preliminaries. Section 4 describes the problem and the proposed framework
for secure computation of kNN and secure verification of kNN. Section 5 focuses on the
verification scheme. We divide the verification into three subsections: Proof Preparation,




2.1 Secure kNN Outsourcing
Researchers have addressed the problem of outsourcing SkNN problem in several papers.
Wong et al. [10] proposed the Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption (ASPE)
scheme, which compares distances by preserving scalar product between the query Q and
tuples t in the database DB. The database and queries are encrypted and outsourced to the
cloud. However, the decryption key sk is revealed to the end-user and the scheme is vulner-
able to chosen-plaintext attacks. Zhu et al. [12] proposed an improved SkNN scheme that
does not reveal the decryption key. However, it requires the end-user to involve in heavy
computations during the query processing step, which contradicts the concept of outsourc-
ing the computations to the cloud. Furthermore, it releases partial information about the key
to end-users while performing kNN computation. Yao et al. [11] proposed a SkNN scheme
that depends on partition-based secure Voronoi diagram (SVD). In their proposed solution,
they required the cloud to return a relevant encrypted partition Epk(G) for Epk(T ) in which
G is guaranteed to contain the k-nearest neighbors to the Q. However, this method returns
inaccurate results to the end-user. Besides, it requires the end-user to involve in the query
processing phase, which is inefficient. Moreover, the proposed solutions in [10], [9], [12]
do not protect the data access pattern from the cloud. Samanthula et al. [8] proposed a
novel SkNN protocol based on the Paillier Cryptosystem’s homomorphic properties. Their
scheme solves the SkNN accurately and guarantees the confidentiality of data and queries.
It also hides the data access patterns from the cloud; however, it requires the data owner to
encrypt the database, which consumes the data owner’s resources.
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2.2 Verifiable Computation on kNN
Wong et al. [15] addressed the problem of the verification of outsourced frequent itemset
mining. They constructed a set of fake (in)frequent itemsets by inserting fake items into the
outsourced database, and check against the fake (in)frequent itemsets to verify the mining
results. They assumed that the server do not have knowledge about these itemsets in the
outsourced datasets. However, the server may be able to collect information about the
outsourced database and escape from the verification step [16], [13]. Dong et al. [13]
adopted a a slightly different method to verify outsourced frequent itemset mining. They
constructed the set of (in)frequent itemsets from the real items. They used this set as
evidence to check the integrity of the mining results returned by the cloud. Nevertheless,
in SkNN, mining results depend on the query Q given by the end-user. Therefore, using
the aforementioned methods for verifying kNN results is not possible. Wang et al. [14]
proposed a verifiable approach of secure kNN computation. Their scheme verifies the
outsourced kNN computation by utilizing the algebraic properties of Asymmetric Scalar
Product Encryption Scheme; however, this scheme is proved to be insecure against chosen
and known plaintext attacks [10]. Moreover, their verification entirely depends on one
server, assuming that it is a semitrusted party. We argue that such assumption may not stand
in practice, as the server may not be able to successfully verify results due to (1) mistakes
during verification phase, (2) financial incentives, (3) or malicious activities. Furthermore,
their scheme reveals information about indices of fake tuples and does not hide data access




The Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme [17]. Data is
encrypted using the public key, pk, and decrypted using the secret key, sk. Let N be the
product of two large prime numbers, p and q, that is, N = p∗ q and φ(N) denotes the Euler
function, which is equal to φ = (p − 1) ∗ (q − 1) such that gcd(N, φ(N)) = 1. Consider
g is the generator in the group Z∗N2 . The public key pk = (N, g), and the private key




The paillier encryption scheme has the following properties:
1. Homomorphic Addition
Epk(a+ b)← Epk(a) ∗ Epk(b) mod N2; a, b ∈ ZN
2. Homomorphic Multiplication
Epk(a ∗ b)← Epk(a)b mod N2; a, b ∈ ZN
3. Semantic Security
The encryption scheme is semantically secure [7]. Given a ciphertext, an adversary
cannot learn any information about the plaintext.
3.2 Random Splitting of Data
Consider Bob has x and wants to randomly split it into two shares, x1 = x + r mod N
and x2 = N − r, and sends them to CSP1 and CSP2, respectively. Let r be a random
number selected by Bob and N be the group size. The summation of the two shares yields
the original value x, that is, (x+ r) + (N − r) mod N = x.
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3.3 Euclidean Distance (d)
Euclidean distance (d) is a metric that measures the distance between two data points.
Considering two vectors X = 〈x1, x2, ..., xm〉 and Y = 〈y1, y2, ..., ym〉:
d(X, Y ) =
√∑m
i=1(xi − yi)2
In this paper, we assume that a data owner outsources the encryption task to two semi-
honest clouds: CSP1 and CSP2. We assume that CSP2 holds the secret key sk, and all
the encryption is done under the Paillier cryptosystem. Table I summarizes some notations
that will be used extensively in this paper.
Table 1: Notations
pk CSP2’s public key
sk CSP2’s secret key
DB1 CSP1’s share of DB
DB2 CSP2’s share of DB
Q1 CSP1’s share of Q
Q2 CSP2’s share of Q
Epk(di) The encryption of the Euclidean Distance of tuple ti
nf Number of fake tuples inserted into DB
εa1 and εb1 Vectors with n values to randomize the ti and di
εa2 and εb2 Vectors with nf values to randomize the fake tuples and the fake distances
εc Vector with n numbers to randomize (ti,j −Qj)
εd1 Vector contains all possible combination of fake tuples
εd2 Vector contains the summation of each possible combination of fake tuples
µ Represents the aggregate value of the randomized fake tuples
β The summation of all possible combinations of fake tuples in two pairs
δ1 and δ2 Proofs of the Euclidean Distance verification
H(ζ1) and H(ζ2) Proofs of sort verification
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4 Problem Description and Framework
In this section, we introduce our system model, and the framework of our solution, which
consists of four stages:
• Stage 1 - Database Outsourcing: CSP1 and CSP2 encrypt their share of the database,
DB1 and DB2, and the latter sends its encrypted share to CSP1. Then, CSP1 adds the two
encrypted randomized data, Epk(DB1) and Epk(DB2), attribute-wise to obtain the original
database Epk(DB) in the encrypted format.
• Stage 2 - Query Outsourcing: Similar to the previous stage, each CSP encrypts its share
of the query, Q1 and Q2. At the end, CSP1 obtains Epk(Q).
• Stage 3 - Secure Computation of kNN: This stage consists of Secure Computation of the
Euclidean Distance (d) and Secure Sorting of the Euclidean Distances.
• Stage 4 - Secure Verification of kNN: This stage consists of Proof Preparation, Euclidean
Distance Verification, and Sort Verification.
The stages are explained in detail in the subsections.
4.1 Stage 1 - Database Outsourcing
Consider a data owner owns a database DB that has n records and m attributes, and ran-
domly splits it attribute-wise, in which, each attribute is divided into two shares, share1
and share2. Let share1 denotes DB1 and share2 denotes DB2. Let N be the group size
and ri,j be a set of random numbers selected by the data owner, in which, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1
≤ j ≤m. Algorithm 1 summarizes the steps of random splitting.
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Algorithm 1 Random Splitting (DB, ri,j , N ) −→ DB1, DB2
1: Initialize: Array DB1, DB2
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: for j = 1 to m do
4: DB1i,j = ti,j + ri,j mod N
5: DB2i,j = N − ri,j
6: return DB1, DB2
Then, the data owner sends DB1 and DB2 to CSP1 and CSP2, respectively. Specifically,
CSP1 receives ti,j + ri,j mod N and CSP2 receives N − ri,j . We emphasize that the
summation of these two shares represents the original value ti,j as shown below:
(ti,j + ri,j) + (N − ri,j) mod N ≡ ti,j
CSP2 will encrypt DB2 using pk and send Epk(DB2) to CSP1. The latter will also en-
crypt its share, DB1, using pk. The next step is to use the additive homomorphic property
to obtain Epk(DB); that is, Epk(DB1 +DB2) = Epk(DB1) * Epk(DB2) mod N2. We em-
phasize that the addition is attribute-wise and the result is known to only CSP1. Table I and
II show the values of DB1 and DB2 after randomly splitting DB in Example 1 from [8].
Table 2: Sample Heart Disease Dataset (DB1)
record-id age sex cp tresbps chol fbs slope ca thal num
t1 63 + r1,1 1 + r1,2 1 + r1,3 145 + r1,4 233 + r1,5 1 + r1,6 3 + r1,7 0 + r1,8 6 + r1,9 0 + r1,10
t2 56 + r2,1 1 + r2,2 3 + r2,3 130 + r2,4 256 + r2,5 1 + r2,6 2 + r2,7 1 + r2,8 6 + r2,9 2 + r2,10
t3 57 + r3,1 0 + r3,2 3 + r3,3 140 + r3,4 241 + r3,5 0 + r3,6 2 + r3,7 0 + r3,8 7 + r3,9 1 + r3,10
t4 59 + r4,1 1 + r4,2 4 + r4,3 144 + r4,4 200 + r4,5 1 + r4,6 2 + r4,7 2 + r4,8 6 + r4,9 3 + r4,10
t5 55 + r5,1 0 + r5,2 4 + r5,3 128 + r5,4 205 + r5,5 0 + r5,6 2 + r5,7 1 + r5,8 7 + r5,9 3 + r5,10
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Table 3: Sample Heart Disease Dataset (DB2)
record-id age sex cp tresbps chol fbs slope ca thal num
t1 N − r1,1 N − r1,2 N − r1,3 N − r1,4 N − r1,5 N − r1,6 N − r1,7 N − r1,8 N − r1,9 N − r1,10
t2 N − r2,1 N − r2,2 N − r2,3 N − r2,4 N − r2,5 N − r2,6 N − r2,7 N − r2,8 N − r2,9 N − r2,10
t3 N − r3,1 N − r3,2 N − r3,3 N − r3,4 N − r3,5 N − r3,6 N − r3,7 N − r3,8 N − r3,9 N − r3,10
t4 N − r4,1 N − r4,2 N − r4,3 N − r4,4 N − r4,5 N − r4,6 N − r4,7 N − r4,8 N − r4,9 N − r4,10
t5 N − r5,1 N − r5,2 N − r5,3 N − r5,4 N − r5,5 N − r5,6 N − r5,7 N − r5,8 N − r5,9 N − r5,10
4.2 Stage 2 - Query Outsourcing
The steps of query outsourcing are similar to the Database Outsourcing Stage. Briefly,
an end-user randomly splits the query into Q1 and Q2, and outsources them to CSP1 and
CSP2, respectively. CSP2 encrypts its share and sends Epk(Q2) to CSP1. CSP1 obtains
Epk(Q1) and then utilizes the additive homomorphic property to obtain Epk(Q).
Algorithm 2 shows the complete steps for data preparation: Database Outsourcing (stage1)
and Query outsourcing (stage 2). We emphasize that the randomization and the encryption
of data are computed attribute-wise.
Algorithm 2 Data Preparation (DB1, DB2, Q1, Q2) −→ Epk(DB), Epk(Q)
1: The data owner sends DB1 to CSP1 and DB2 to CSP2
2: CSP1 and CSP2:
• CSP2 encrypts DB2 and sends Epk(DB2) to CSP1
• CSP1 encrypts DB1
3: for i = 1 to n do:
• for j = 1 to m do:
– CSP1 performs:
* Epk(ti,j) = Epk(ti,j)1 ∗ Epk(ti,j)2 mod N2
5: Bob sends Q1 to CSP1 and Q2 to CSP2
• CSP2 encrypts Q2 and send Epk(Q2) to CSP1
• CSP1 encrypts Q1
6: for j = 1 to m do:
• CSP1 do
– Epk(Q) = Epk(Qj)1 ∗ Epk(Qj)2 mod N2;
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4.3 Stage 3 - Secure Computation of kNN
This paper slightly modifies the proposed scheme of computing SkNN in [8] and focuses
on proposing a probabilistic approach for verifying SkNN returned results. For the com-
putation phase, we will adopt Algorithm 6 proposed in [8]; however, we do not require the
data owner and the end-user to encrypt DB and Q. Specifically, we outsource the encryp-
tion task to the cloud to reduce the workload on the data owner and the end-user. Besides,
we added a few steps to Algorithm 6 in [8] to combine the computation and the verification
phases. The following are the various stages in the secure computation of kNN.
4.3.1 Secure Computation of the Euclidean Distance di
The clouds start computing the Euclidean Distance between Epk(Q) and Epk(ti) where 1
≤ i ≤ n. The protocols used to compute theEpk(di) are briefly explained below. Interested
readers can refer to [8] for more details.
• Secure Multiplication (SM):
Consider CSP1 sends (Epk(a), Epk(b)) to CSP2 for computing secure multiplica-
tion. It selects different random numbers, ra and rb, to randomize Epk(a) and Epk(b).
Then, it sends the randomized encrypted values to CSP2 that decrypts, multiplies the
numbers, encrypts the result and sends it to CSP1. Subsequently, CSP1 utilizes the
additive homomorphic property to remove the randomness from the result as shown
below:
a ∗ b = (a+ ra) ∗ (b+ rb)− a ∗ rb − b ∗ ra − ra ∗ rb
The output Epk(a ∗ b) is known only to CSP1.
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• Secure Squared Euclidean Distance (SSED):
Consider CSP1 has a tuple, Epk(ti) = 〈Epk(t1), Epk(t2), . . . ., Epk(tm)〉 and CSP2
has a query Epk(Q) = 〈Epk(Q1), Epk(Q2), . . . ., Epk(Qm)〉 , then, the Squared Eu-




CSP1 computes Epk(ti,j −Qj), and sends the result to CSP2 for secure multiplica-
tion, SM(Epk(ti,j −Qj), Epk(ti,j −Qj)). At the end of this protocol, CSP1 adds the
squared differences and computes the final distance between Epk(ti) and Epk(Q).
4.3.2 Secure Sorting of the Euclidean Distance di
The following protocols are utilized to sort the Euclidean Distances:
• Secure Bit-Decomposition (SBD):
This protocol is adopted from [18]. It takes the encryption of a digit as input and out-
puts the encryption of individual bits that represent this digit. Let CSP1 has Epk(x)
and CSP2 has sk. SBD should outputs a vector that contains the encryption of indi-
vidual bits that represent x, [x] = 〈Epk(x1), ...., Epk(xl)〉 where 1 and l represent the
most and the least significant bits of [x]. The final result is only known to CSP1.
• Secure Minimum (SMIN):
This algorithm takes two encrypted vectors as input and outputs the minimum value.
Consider [x] and [y] are two vectors that represent the encryption of individual bits
of two values, x and y, respectively. CSP1 has ([x], [y]) and CSP2 holds sk. The
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protocol outputs [min(x, y)], and it is only known to CSP1.
• Secure Minimum out of n Numbers (SMINn)
This algorithm takes all the distances, in the encrypted format of each individual bit,
between the query and each ti as input and outputs the smallest distance di. Consider
CSP1 has ([d1],...,[dn]) and CSP2 has sk where 1≤ i ≤ n, and for each vector [di] =
(Epk[di,1],...,Epk[di,l]) , in which, 1 and l represent the most and the least significant
bits of [di], respectively. The output [min(d1, ..., (dn)] is known to only CSP1.
It is important to mention that the above protocols are directly adopted from the literature.
In SVC-kNN, we added Stage (1) and Stage (2) to outsource the encryption of DB and Q
to the cloud. The purpose of adding these stages is to maximize the use of the clouds and
reduce the workload on the data owner and the end-user which is more efficient.
After the data preparation phase explained in Algorithm 2, CSP1 and CSP2 will start the
Secure Computation of kNN. In general, for each encrypted tupleEpk(ti), CSP1 andCSP2
will compute the SSED, that is:
1. CSP1 has Epk(Q) and Epk(ti).
2. CSP1 computes the difference between the query and each tuple attribute-wise.
3. CSP1 sends the computed differences toCSP2 for secure multiplication, SM(Epk(ti,j−
Qj), Epk(ti,j −Qj)).
4. Upon receiving the SM results fromCSP2, CSP1 will use the additive homomorphic
property to obtain Epk(di), which is equivalent to Epk(ti −Q)2. This result is only
known to CSP1.
Then, CSP1 and CSP2 start the Secure Sorting of the Euclidean Distance di. For each
distance di, the clouds execute SBD to compute the encryption of individual bits that repre-
sent the encryption of the distance, in which Epk[di] = 〈Epk(di,1), Epk(di,2),...., Epk(di,l)〉
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where 1 and l represent the most and the least significant bits of the distance. The clouds
execute this protocol n times, and pass the outputs as parameters to the SMINn protocol.
We emphasize that all data is encrypted, all the computations are on the encrypted data,
and the outputs of all the protocols are only known to CSP1.
After that, CSP1 and CSP2 will compute the k-nearest records to Epk(Q) in an iterative
way. The steps are similar to Algorithm 6 in [8] with slight variations and are shown in
Algorithm 3.
Briefly, CSP1 andCSP2 executes SMIN protocol n times instead of k times in order obtain
the complete sorted distances. Then, CSP1 computes the difference between the minimum
distance dmin and every other distance di, permutes them and sends the encrypted vector
β to CSP2. Upon receiving β, CSP2 decrypts and observes only one attribute with the
value 0. Then, it computes vector U such that the attribute containing value 0 is updated as
Epk(1) and the other attributes as Epk(0), and sends U to CSP1.
CSP1 performs the inverse permutation after receiving U . It then raises each encrypted
value in vector V to the power of its respective index and then applies the summation.
Using the additive homomorphic property of pailler cryptosystem, CSP1 performs this
operation by itself to obtain the sorted encrypted indices. The distance vectors are updated
for every iteration using SBOR protocol.
CSP1 obtains the encryption of all the sorted indices, permutes them and sends them to
CSP2 for the verification step. Besides, during the verification step, CSP1 obtains the
hashes of the indices of fake tuples H(ξ) from CSP2. It is important to mention that
the SVC-kNN requires this information to obtain the final k nearest records. Specifically,
CSP1 checks if any of the hashes of fake tuples H(ξi) is equal to any of the hashes of
sorted indices i′s. If this statement were executed, CSP1 adds 1 to ctr. At the end of the
iterations, CSP1 updates k; that is, k′ = k + ctr.
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Finally, CSP1 obtains the top k′ records, discards the fake tuples, and sends k real records
to user. More Specifically, CSP1 executes SM protocol of vector V and actual tuple, and
then applies a summation. This yields only one tuple that corresponds to the minimum
distance and the process is repeated for k′ iterations where k′ is the updated value of k
based on the existence fake tuples. Finally, CSP1 removes the tuples that correspond to the
hashes of fake indices, and sends the actual k nearest records to the end-user.
4.4 Stage 4 - Secure Verification of kNN
This stage concentrates on verifying the integrity of the computed k-nearest records. Sim-
ilar to the Secure Computation of kNN, CSP1, CSP2, the data owner, and the end-user
participate in the Secure Verification of kNN. As mentioned earlier, during the Database
Outsourcing Stage, the data owner generates auxiliary information, randomly splits it, and
sends the shares to CSP1 and CSP2. Moreover, the clouds require a variety of information
to construct the proofs δ1, δ2, H(ζ1), and H(ζ2). In detail, the information used in evidence
construction is, the encrypted Euclidean Distance Epk(di), four random vectors, εa1 and
εa2 ,εb1 , and εb2 , vector µ that represents the aggregate values of the randomized fake tuples,
and vector β that represents the aggregate of the product of all possible combinations of µ
in two pairs. We emphasize that the Secure Verification of kNN involves CSP1 and CSP2
in constructing evidence such that each evidence requires different steps and distinct vari-
ables. Our solution in this paper incorporates several verification steps: Proof Generation,
Evidence Preparation, Euclidean Distances Verification, and Sort Verification, which we
will discuss in the next section. It is important to mention that the computation and the ver-
ification steps are closely associated. However, in this paper, they are explained separately
for more clarity and convenience.
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Algorithm 3 SkNNm (di) −→ Isorted, 〈 (t′1), ...., (t′k′) 〉
1: CSP1 and CSP2:
(a). CSP1 obtains E(Q) in Algorithm 2
(b). for i = 1 to n do:
• Epk(di)← SSED(Epk(Q), Epk(ti))
• [di]← SBD(Epk(di))
2: for s = 1 to n do:
(a). CSP1 and CSP2:




γ=0 Epk(dmin, γ + 1)
2l−γ−1
• if s 6= 1 then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
– Epk(di)←
∏l−1
γ=0 Epk(di, γ + 1)
2l−γ−1
• for i = 1 to n do:
– τi← Epk(dmin) * Epk(di)N−1
– τ ′i ← τ rii , where ri ∈ R ZN
• β ← π(τ ′); send β to CSP2
(c). CSP2 :
• Receives β from CSP1
• β ′i ← Dsk(βi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• Computes U, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
– if β ′i = 0 then Ui = Epk(1)
– else Ui = Epk(0)
• Send U to CSP1
(d). CSP1:
• Receive U from CSP2 and compute V ← π−1(U)






(e). CSP1 and CSP2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Epk(di, γ)← SBOR(Vi, Epk(di, γ)), for 1 ≤ γ ≤ 1
3: CSP1 :
(a). Based on the sort verification step, the value of k′ is determined.
• for i = 1 to k do:
• for j = 1 to nf do:
• if H(is) = H(ξj)
• ctr + +
• k′ = k + ctr
4: for s = 1 to k′ do:
(a). CSP1 :






• Epk(t′s) = 〈 Epk(t′s,1), ...., Epk(t′s,m) 〉
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5 Verification Scheme
In this section, we design a probabilistic verification approach that verifies the kNN results.
More specifically, this approach captures any unexpected behavior that may return wrong
k-nearest records. The proposed scheme utilizes the computational resources of the cloud
and avoids assigning heavy computations to the data owner. Figure 2 shows the Verification
Scheme. The following explains the verification stages in detail.
Figure 2: Verification Scheme
5.1 Proof Preparation
As mentioned in the Database Outsourcing Stage, the data owner inserts nf artificial tuples
into the dataset; that is, the randomly split DB includes both the real and the fake tuples.
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The data owner records the number of fake tuples in nf , and the indices of fake tuples in
a vector [If ]. The reason behind adding these tuples is to use them in (1) The Euclidean
Distance Verification and (2) Sort Verification. Moreover, the data owner constructs the
following:
• A random vector εa1 ; that is, εa1 = 〈εa11 , ..., εa1n〉. This vector contains n random num-
bers for randomizing all the real and the fake tuples. This vector is only known to CSP1.
• A random vector εa2; that is, εa2 = 〈εa21 , ..., εa2nf 〉. We highlight that εa2 is a subset of
εa1; that is, εa2 ⊂ εa1 , and stores nf random numbers for only the fake tuples. This vector
is only known to CSP2.
• A random vector εb1; that is, εb1 = 〈εb11 , ..., εb1n〉. This vector stores n random numbers
for randomizing all the Euclidean DistancesEpk(di). This vector is only known toCSP1.
• A random vector εb2; that is, εb2 = 〈εb21 , ..., εb2nf 〉. This vector stores nf random num-
bers, and is a subset of εb1; that is, εb2 ⊂ εb1 . CSP2 requires this vector to remove the
randomness from the randomized Euclidean Distances dir between Q and each fake tu-
ple. This vector is only known to CSP2.
• A verification vector, µ =
∑nf
i=1 (εa2i + ti).
• A verification vector, β =
∑n−1
i=1 (εa2i + ti) ∗
[∑n
i=i+1 (εa2i + ti)
]
It is important to mention that µ and β are only known to CSP1. Algorithm 4 shows the
construction of µ. Let n be 5 and nf be 3, meaning that there are only three artificial tuples
and two real tuples in DB. Let N be the group size; then, εa1 = 〈 εa11 , εa12 , εa13 , εa14 , εa15
〉 and εa2 = 〈 εa21 , εa22 , εa23 〉. Consider (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3) three fake tuples that
represent t1, t2, and t3, respectively. µ1 = (x1 + εa11 , y1 + εa11), µ2 = (x2 + εa12 , y2 + εa12),
µ3 = (x3 + εa13 , y3 + εa13); then µ is the summation of µ1, µ2, and µ3:
µ = [(x1 + εa11) + (x2 + εa12) + (x3 + εa13), (y1 + εa11) + (y2 + εa12) + (y3 + εa13)]
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Algorithm 4 Construction of µ
1: Require: εa2 , ti
2: Initialize: µ
3: for i = 1 to nf do:
• Initialize: µi
• for j = 1 to m do:
– µi,j ←εa2i + ti,j
• µ += µi
Then, using the information of µ, the data owner construct vector β, such that β = (µ1 * µ2)
+ (µ1 * µ3) + (µ2 * µ3). We emphasize that the number of combinations of µ depends on
the number of fake tuples; and is based on the combination permutation formula, c(n, r) =
n!
(n−r)!∗r! , where n = nf and r = 2 because the number of pairs is two.
We emphasize that the data owner randomly splits all the auxiliary information between
CSP1 and CSP2. Then, CSP1 and CSP2 consolidate the randomly split auxiliary infor-
mation to obtain the encryption of each one. For the information known to CSP1, CSP2
encrypts its share and sends the encrypted values to CSP1. CSP1 also encrypts its share,
and then obtains the encryption of the original value using the additive homomorphic prop-
erty, and vice-versa for the information known to CSP2.
5.2 Euclidean Distance Verification
Each CSP is responsible for constructing and sending the evidence to the end-user. Based
on the auxiliary information, CSP1 and CSP2 construct δ1 and δ2, respectively. Upon
receiving the proofs, the end-user verifies if ∆ = δ1 - δ2 = 0, that is if, δ1 = δ2. Besides,
each cloud utilizes different parameters to construct its proof; however, both equations
must compute the exact final result. In this section, we produce a novel theorem to verify
the computation of Epk(di). We show that δ1 ≡ δ2 using Proof by Induction methodology.
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Algorithm 5 δ1 Computation (µ, β,Q, nf ) −→ δ1
1: Requie: CSP1 has µ, β,Q, nf and CSP2 has sk
2: Initialize: r
3: CSP1 computes:
• Epk(2Q)← Epk(Q) ∗ Epk(Q) mod N2
• Epk(A)← Epk(µ) ∗ Epk(2Q)N−1
• Epk(B)← Epk(β) ∗ Epk(β) mod N2
4: CSP1 and CSP2 performs:
• Epk(C)← SM(Epk(µ), Epk(A)), send Epk(C) to CSP1
• Epk(D)← SM(Epk(Q), Epk(Q)), send Epk(D) to CSP1
• Epk(E)← SM(Epk(D), Epk(nf )), send Epk(E) to CSP1
5: CSP1 computes:
• Epk(F )← Epk(C) ∗ Epk(B)N−1
• Epk(δ1)← Epk(F ) ∗ Epk(E) mod N2
• Epk(δ1r)← Epk(δ1) ∗ Epk(r) mod N2
• Send Epk(δ1r) to CSP2, send r to end-user
6: CSP2 :
• δ1r ←Dsk(δ1r), send δ1r to end-user
7: End-user:
• δ1 = δ1r - r
5.2.1 Construction of Proof1 (δ1)
CSP1 constructs Proof1 and sends it to the end-user. Equation (1) shows δ1 construction,
and Algorithm 5 explains the steps of implementation. Although CSP2 assists CSP1,
the workload assigned to CSP2 is minimal. Besides, CSP2 cannot learn any information
because it computes all the operations on randomized data. We emphasize that CSP1 only
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knows Epk(δ1) and the final result δ1 is only known to the end-user.
Algorithm 6 Proof2 Preparation (Epk(εb1), Epk(di), Epk(ti,j−Qj))→ (Epk(dir), Epk(ti−
Q)r)
1: Initialize: vector εc
2: CSP1 :
• Epk(ti −Q) =
∑m
j=1(Epk(ti,j −Qj))
• for i = 1 to n do:
– Epk(dir)← Epk(εb1i) * Epk(di) mod N2
– Epk(ti −Q)r ← Epk(εci) * Epk(ti −Q) mod N2
• Send Epk(dir) and Epk(ti −Q)r to CSP2
5.2.2 Construction of Proof2 (δ2)
CSP2 constructs δ2 in two steps. Firstly, it computes the randomized proof δ2r; then, it
removes the randomness to obtain δ2.
5.2.2.1 Randomized Proof δ2r :
The reason behind adding this step is that computing δ2 requires (1) the encrypted Eu-
clidean Distance between the query Q and each fake tuple ti, and (2) the encrypted dif-
ferences between the query Q and each fake tuple ti. Besides, CSP1 cannot send (1) and
(2) because it does not know the indices of fake tuples in DB. Also, since CSP1 knows
the tuple and the query in the encrypted form, it is not secure to reveal the indices of fake
tuples to it, as it could cheat by doing the computations properly only for the fake tuples.
Furthermore, CSP2 holds sk; hence, CSP1 must not send the Euclidean Distances and
the differences for all tuples to CSP2. Therefore, CSP1 randomizes Epk(di) using εb1 and
Epk(ti −Q) using vector εc. We highlight that εb1 is generated by the data owner and εc is
generated by CSP1. The reason behind assigning εb1 to the data owner is that we will need
to securely share the random numbers added to the distances of fake tuples with CSP2 as
24
it requires them to solve equation (4). Therefore, the data owner generates εb1 and εb2 , and
sends them to CSP1 and CSP2, respectively. Algorithm 6 explains Proof2 Preparation.
After CSP1 sends Epk(dir) and Epk(ti − Q)r to CSP2, the latter selects the randomized
distances and differences for only the fake tuples based on the indices in If . Then, it
computes δ2r using (3), which is similar to equation (2) but it outputs δ2r. Algorithm 7
illustrates the computation of δ2r. It is important to mention that CSP2 decrypts all the













Algorithm 7 δ2r Computation (dir, εa2 , (ti −Q)r) −→δ2r
1: Require: CSP2 has m, εa2 , dir, (ti −Q)r, and If
2: CSP2 performs:
• δ2r = 0
3: for i = 1 to nf do:
• CSP2 computes:
– a = (ti −Q)r + (ti −Q)r
– b←m * εa2i
– c← a + b
– d = c * εa2i
– δ2r + = dir + d
5.2.2.2 Remove randomness from δ2r :
CSP1 receives the auxiliary information from the data owner during the Database Out-
sourcing Stage. It will use this information to locally perform a set of operations that are
required to remove the randomness from all δ2r . We emphasize that CSP1 executes the
following steps only once for each database:
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• Computes Rti based on εa1 , εb1 , and εc where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as per equation (4):
Rti = (εb1i + εa1i(2 ∗ εci)) (4)
• Generates all possible combinations of fake tuples in pair of nf , and stores them in vector
εd1 . Each attribute in εd1 represents one combination of indices. For instance, suppose n
= 3 and nf = 2; then, the vector εd1 = 〈(1,2),(1,3),(2,3)〉.
• Constructs vector εd2 by adding the Rt values for each combination in εd1 . For instance, if
a combination stored in εd1i is (1, 2), the corresponding index in εd2i contains Rt1 + Rt2 .
• Sends εd1 and εd2 to CSP2.
As mentioned previously, CSP1 performs the previous steps only once for each database,
and sends vectors εd1 and εd2 to CSP2. Similarly, CSP2 receives these two vectors only
once for each DB, and uses them every time to remove the randomness from the all δ2r .
Specifically, CSP2 selects the correct combination of fake tuples from εd1; then, it finds the
value in the corresponding index in εd2 . Finally, CSP2 obtains δ2 as shown in (5):
δ2 = δ2r − εd2i (5)
5.3 Sort Verification
Similar to the Euclidean Distance Verification stage, each CSP is responsible for con-
structing and sending evidence to the end-user. Using the computed Euclidean distances,
each CSP sorts the distances of fake tuples di, and constructs H(ζ1) and H(ζ2). Upon
receiving the proofs, the end-user verifies if Z = H(ζ1) - H(ζ2) = 0; that is, H(ζ1) = H(ζ2).
Each hash value, H(ζ1) and H(ζ2), represents the concatenation of θ and the hash values
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of the sorted indices of fake tuples. The computation of the hash values of all indices is
assigned to CSP2 that generates a random salting value η. CSP2 concatenates η to each
index and computes the hash value over the result as shown in equation (6).
H(ξi) = η|ξi (6)
We emphasize that η is generated for each query processing operation, used for computing
the hash value of each indexH(ξi) and is only known to CSP2. We also emphasize that the
final hash value H(ζ) is computed using a different salting value θ that is known to both
CSP1 and CSP2. H(ζ) represents the hash values of the sorted and concatenated indices
of all fake tuples as per equation (7). Algorithm 8 explains the steps for Sort Verification.
5.3.1 Construction of H(ζ1)
As mentioned in Algorithm 3, CSP1 obtains the sorted indices V ′ at step 2(d). CSP1 will
permute V ′ and send the permuted vector ρ to CSP2. Upon receiving ρ, CSP2 decrypts
and computes the hash value for each index using equation (6), and sends ρ′ to CSP1.
CSP1 implements the inverse permutation on ρ′ to obtain κ vector that represents the hash
values of sorted indices.
Besides, CSP1 receives another vector of hashes denoted by σ from CSP2. Specifically, σ
represents the hash values of unsorted indices of fake tuples. Next, CSP1 sorts σ using the
information stored in κ. Finally, CSP1 computes H(ζ1) and sends it to the end-user:
H(ζ1) = H[θ|(H(σ1)|H(σ2)|H(σ3)|.....|H(σnf ))] (7)
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5.3.2 Construction of H(ζ2)
Based on the Euclidean Distance Verification step, CSP1 sends Epk(dir) to CSP2. Using
the information If and εb2 shared by the data owner, CSP2 decrypts Epk(dir) and Epk(εb2)
for only fake tuples. Then, it obtains the real distances of fake tuples di; that is, di =
dir - εb2 . Then, using the distance information di, CSP2 sorts the indices of fake tuples,
and computes the hash value for each index in If as per equation (6). Finally, CSP2
concatenates the sorted hashes, adds the salting value θ, computes H(ζ2), and sends it to
the end-user.
We highlight that εb2 contains the random numbers added to only fake distances and it is
impossible for CSP2 to obtain the distances of real tuples since it does not have the random
values.
The end-user concludes that the Euclidean distances were computed and sorted properly
with a high probability only if H(ζ1) = H(ζ2). After that, CSP1 obtains the top k records
as explained in Algorithm 3, randomizes them, and sends them to CSP2 who is responsible
for decryption. Upon receiving the random numbers from CSP1 and the randomized top
k records in the plain format from CSP2, the end-user will remove the randomness and
obtain the k-nearest tuples.
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Algorithm 8 Sort Verification (V ′)→ H(ζ1), H(ζ2)
1: Require: CSP2 knows η, dir, CSP1 and CSP2 know θ, CSP1 knows V ′
2: for i = 1 to n do:
(a). CSP1:
• ρ← π(V ′); and sends ρ to CSP2
(b). CSP2 :
• Decypt ρ to obtain the permuted indices
• H(ξ)i = η | ξi
• ρ′i← H(ξ)i, and sends ρ′ to CSP1
(c). CSP1 :
• κ← π−1(ρ′)
3: for i = 1 to nf do:
(a). CSP2 :
• H(ξ)i = η | ξi
• σi← H(ξ)i, and sends σ to CSP1
(b). CSP1 :
• HeapSort(σ) based on κ
• σ′← concatenated sorted σ
• H(ζ1) = θ | σ′
• Send H(ζ1) to end-user
(c). CSP2:
• dir ← Dsk(dri)
• εb2 ← Dsk(εb2)
• di = dir - εb2
• disorted ← HeapSort(di)
• for each index in Isorted, compute:
– H(ξi) = η|ξi
• H(ζ2) = H[θ|(H(ξ1)|H(ξ2)|H(ξ3)|.....|H(ξnf ))]
• Send H(ζ2) to the end-user
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6 Conclusions
Data owners tend to outsource the computation and the verification of data to the cloud,
which raises security and privacy concerns about the confidentiality and the integrity of
data. In this thesis, we proposed a novel framework SVC-kNN that combines the com-
putation and the verification of the k-nearest neighbor problem. The SVC-kNN involves
four parties: Data Owner, End-User, CSP1, and CSP2. It also utilizes the homomorphic
properties of the Paillier cryptosystem. Besides, it is secure under the semi-honest model.
Additionally, this scheme maximizes the usage of the clouds’ computational power due
to assigning the encryption of data to CSP1 and CSP2. This will reduce the computa-
tion overhead on query issuers and data owners. The latter randomly split the databases
and send each share to the corresponding CSP ; then, the clouds consolidates the data and
obtain Epk(DB). Moreover, we adopted the computation of k-nearest records from the
literature; however, we slightly changed the existing solution and combined it with our ver-
ification protocol. Furthermore, our solution for the Secure Verification and Computation
of kNN (SVC-kNN) consists of three stages: Proof Preparation, Euclidean Distance Veri-
fication, and Sort Verification. We emphasize that our verification scheme is probabilistic,
and the SVC-kNN involves two clouds in verifying the top k records under the assumption
that these clouds do not collude with each other. This framework verifies the Euclidean
Distance at first where CSP1 and CSP2 construct proofs using different parameters, and
send δ1 and δ2 to the end-user, respectively. Only if the Euclidean Distance verification
were successful, the cloud proceeds toward the sort verification where each CSP sends
H(ζ1) and H(ζ2), and the end-user verifies the equality of both values.
Due to time limitations, we could not implement SVC-kNN. Therefore, we left the experi-
ments and the security analysis tasks for future work. Additionally, we will investigate how
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to extend the proposed SVC-kNN to other security models.
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We provided δ1 and δ2 equations in Section 4, and mentioned that they are mathematically
equivalent. We will prove by induction methodology that, δ1 ≡ δ2 for all n ∈ Z, where Z

















The random values of fake tuples are exactly the same in εa1 and εa2 . For simplicity reasons,
we use r to denote these random values. Also, we assume that m = 1, meaning that each
tuple has one attribute.
µ =
∑nf
i=1 (εa2i + ti)
β =
∑n−1
i=1 (εa2i + ti) ∗
[∑n
i=i+1 (εa2i + ti)
]
(1) Base Case: Prove that the equation holds when n = 1,
Since n = 1, µ = r+ ti = t+ r, β = 0 because the number of combinations of µ is 0; then:
L.H.S (δ1) = µ(µ− 2Q)− 2β + nf (Q)2
= (t+ r)[(t+ r)− 2Q]− 2(0) + (1)Q2
= (t+ r)2 − 2Q(t+ r) +Q2
= t2 + r2 + 2tr − 2Qt− 2Qr +Q2
= t2 + r2 +Q2 + 2tr − 2Qt− 2Qr





j=1(ti,j −Q)2 + ri(mri + 2(ti,j −Q))]
34
= (t−Q)2 + r[r + 2(t−Q)]
= t2 − 2tQ+Q2 + r[r + 2t− 2Q]
= t2 − 2tQ+Q2 + r2 + 2tr − 2Qr
= t2 +Q2 + r2 + 2tr − 2tQ− 2Qr
= (Q− t− r)2
Therefore, both sides are equal when n = 1.




i=1(ti + ri) − 2Q] − 2
[∑k−1





i=1[(ti −Q)2 + ri[ri + 2(ti −Q)]]















i=1 (ti + ri)[
∑k+1
i=1 (ti + ri)− 2Q]− 2
[∑k−1+1

















































Substituting the L.H.S of the induction step with the R.H.S:
=
∑k
i=1[(ti−Q)2 + ri[ri + 2(ti−Q)]] + 2[µk+1 ∗
∑k
i=1 µi] + (µk+1)





=[[(t1 −Q)2 + r1(r1 + 2(t1 −Q))] + ....+ [(tk −Q)2 + rk(rk + 2(tk −Q))]] + (µk+1)2 −
2qµk+1 +Q
2
=[[(t1 −Q)2 + r1(r1 + 2(t1 −Q))] + ....+ [(tk −Q)2 + rk(rk + 2(tk −Q))]] + (tk+1)2 +
(rk+1)
2 + 2 ∗ tk+1 ∗ rk+1 − 2Qtk+1 − 2Qrk+1 +Q2
=[[(t1 − Q)2 + r1(r1 + 2(t1 − Q))] + .... + [(tk − Q)2 + rk(rk + 2(tk − Q))]] + (tk+1 −
Q)2 + (rk+1)
2 + 2tk+1rk+1 − 2Qrk+1
=[[(t1 − Q)2 + r1(r1 + 2(t1 − Q))] + .... + [(tk − Q)2 + rk(rk + 2(tk − Q))]] + (tk+1 −
Q)2 + rk+1[rk+1 + 2tk+1 − 2Q]
=[[(t1 − Q)2 + r1(r1 + 2(t1 − Q))] + .... + [(tk − Q)2 + rk(rk + 2(tk − Q))]] + (tk+1 −
Q)2 + rk+1[rk+1 + 2(tk+1 −Q)]
=
∑k+1
i=1 [(ti −Q)2 + ri[ri + 2(ti −Q)]] = R.H.S
36
